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Abstract: This paper employs a stochastic growth model to analyze the effect of macroeconomic 
volatility on the relationship between income distribution and growth.  We initially characterize the 
equilibrium and show how the distribution of income depends upon two factors: the initial 
distribution of capital, and the equilibrium labor supply and find that an increase in volatility raises 
the mean growth rate and income inequality.  We calibrate the model using standard parameter 
estimates, and find that it successfully replicates key growth and distributional characteristics.  The 
latter part of the paper uses this framework to analyze the design of tax policy to achieve desired 
growth, distribution, and welfare objectives.  Two general conclusions clearly emerge. First, 
increasing (average) welfare and the growth rate does not necessarily entail an increase in inequality.  
Second, fiscal policy often has conflicting effects on the distributions of gross and net income, with 
changes in factor prices resulting in greater pre-tax inequality but the redistributive effect of taxes 
yielding a more equal post-tax distribution.  
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1.  Introduction 
Research on the macroeconomic determinants of income inequality has focused mainly on 
three aspects: growth, trade, and inflation. Studies of the impact of growth on distribution range from 
the analyses of the impact of structural change, such as the Kuznets hypothesis, to theories of skill-
biased technical change. Based on Heckscher-Ohlin theory, international trade has been argued to be 
a major determinant of income distribution, and this aspect has recently acquired prominence in the 
debate on the increase in inequality in a number of industrialized countries. One of the most 
consistently supported empirical correlations is that between inflation and inequality, explained by 
the fact that because inflation is a regressive tax, it generates greater income inequality.
1  Our paper 
seeks to introduce a new and so far ignored factor, the degree of aggregate risk in the economy, into 
the analysis of inequality.  
Empirical evidence suggests that macroeconomic volatility is potentially an important 
channel through which income inequality and growth may be mutually related.  A striking difference 
when we compare Latin American economies with those of the OECD is that the former are 
associated with much greater income inequality.  In 1990, the Gini coefficients of the distribution of 
income in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela ranged between 49-64%, while those for the OECD 
range between 24-44%.  At the same time, the former were subject to much greater fluctuations in 
their respective growth rates than were the latter: during the 1980s, the standard deviation of the rate 
of output growth was, on average, 4.9% for the four Latin American economies, and 2.7% for the 
OECD. 
2  In fact, using a broader set of data, Breen and García-Peñalosa (2004) obtain a positive 
relationship between a country’s volatility (measured by the standard deviation of the rate of GDP 
growth) and income inequality.   
Our objective in this paper is to model a mechanism through which aggregate risk -- which 
we shall attribute to production shocks -- has a direct impact on distribution.  We employ an 
extension of the stochastic growth model developed by Grinols and Turnovsky (1993, 1998), Smith 
                                                 
1 See Okun (1971) and Taylor (1981), and more recently, Albanesi (2003). 
2 See Breen and García-Peñalosa (2004) for a description of the data sources used for these calculations.  2 
(1996), Corsetti (1997) and Turnovsky (2000b).  This is a one-sector growth model in which, due to 
the presence of an externality stemming from the aggregate capital stock, equilibrium output evolves 
in accordance with a stochastic AK technology.  Adopting this framework, aggregate production risk 
jointly determines the equilibrium growth rate, its volatility, and the distribution of income.
3 
Previous studies have been unable to analyze the impact of volatility on income distribution, 
as they either abstract from labor, or otherwise, assume that agents are identical in all respects.  We 
introduce the assumption that agents are heterogeneous with respect to their initial endowments of 
capital, and allow for an elastic supply of labor.  As a result, the labor supply responses to different 
degrees of risk will induce changes in factor prices and affect the distribution of income.   
Our analysis proceeds in several stages.  To start with, we derive the equilibrium balanced 
growth path in a stochastic growth model with given tax rates.  We show how this equilibrium has a 
simple recursive structure.  First, the equilibrium mean growth rate and labor supply (employment) 
are jointly determined to ensure that rates of return are in equilibrium and that the product market 
clears.  These equilibrium quantities are affected by the degree of risk in the economy but are 
independent of the distribution of wealth.  Second, the equilibrium labor supply, together with the 
given initial distribution of capital among agents, is shown to determine the volatility of the growth 
rate, on the one hand, and the degree of income inequality, on the other.  We find that an increase in 
production risk raises the mean growth rate, its volatility, and the degree of income inequality.   
The intuition for these results is straightforward.  Because agents are sufficiently risk-averse, 
a greater variance of output has a strong income effect that induces them to increase their labor 
supply, increase their savings, and thus raise the growth rate.  The increase in the labor supply raises 
the return to capital and lowers the real wage, thereby affecting the distribution of income.  Since 
labor is more equally distributed than is capital, the income gap between any two individuals 
increases, and, for a given initial distribution of wealth, income distribution becomes more unequal. 
The latter part of the paper uses this framework to analyze the effects of taxation. As is well-
known, the externality associated with the capital stock implies that the competitive growth rate is 
                                                 
3 Growth regressions have suggested that the mean growth rate is related to its volatility, although the results are not 
uniform. Kormendi and Mequire (1985) obtained a positive relationship, while Ramey and Ramey (1995) found a 
negative one.  3 
too low. The first-best allocation can then be attained through suitable taxes and subsidies. When 
agents are heterogeneous, the use of growth-enhancing policies raises the question of the impact 
first-best policies have on the distribution of income.  Two general conclusions emerge from our 
analysis. First, increasing (average) welfare and the growth rate does not necessarily entail an 
increase in inequality, as faster growth tends to be associated with lower post-tax income inequality. 
Second, we find that fiscal policy has conflicting effects on the distributions of gross and net income. 
First-best policies result in changes in factor prices that increase pre-tax inequality, but the direct 
redistributive effect of taxes tends to yield a more equal post-tax distribution. As a resul,t gross and 
net income inequality often move in opposite directions.  
The paper contributes to the recent literature looking at the relationship between income 
distribution and growth.
4  It is related to Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), 
and  Bertola (1993), who develop (non-stochastic) AK growth models in which agents differ in their 
initial stocks of capital.  The first two papers have, however, a very different focus as they take 
initial inequality as given and argue that it has a negative impact on the rate of growth.  In contrast to 
their results, this paper emphasizes that growth and distribution are jointly determined, and presents 
a possible mechanism that generates a positive relationship between these two variables in line with 
the evidence presented by Forbes (2000). Bertola (1993) is closer to our approach in that he 
emphasizes how technological parameters, specifically the productivity of capital, jointly determine 
distribution and growth. He also examines how policies directed at increasing the growth rate affect 
the distribution of consumption, although his assumption of a constant labor supply implies that the 
distribution of income is independent of policy choices.  Our approach shares with these three papers 
an important limitation, namely, that the assumption that agents differ only in their initial stocks of 
capital coupled with an AK technology implies that there are no income dynamics.
5 
The paper closest to our work, at least in spirit, is Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999), who 
find that greater inequality is associated with more volatility.  They show how combining capital 
                                                 
4 See, among others, Stiglitz (1969), Bourguignon (1981), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997), as 
well as the overview in Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999).  
5 A more general study of heterogeneity and the dynamics of distribution in growth models can be found in Caselli and 
Ventura (2000). 
 4 
market imperfections with inequality in a two-sector model can generate endogenous fluctuations in 
output and investment.  In their model it is unequal access to investment opportunities and the gap 
between the returns to investment in the modern and the traditional sectors that cause fluctuations.  
We reverse the focus, examining how exogenous production uncertainty determines output volatility 
and income distribution. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the equilibrium 
growth rate, labor supply, and volatility. Section 3 examines the determinants of the distribution of 
income. Section 4 shows, analytically and numerically, that in the absence of taxation greater risk is 
associated with a more unequal distribution of income. Section 5 starts by obtaining the first-best 
optimum, and shows that the competitive growth rate is too low. It is followed by an analysis of 
first-best taxation, and a number of second-best policies. Numerical analysis is then used to illustrate 
the distributional implications of the various policies.  Section 6 concludes, while technical details 
are provided in the Appendix.  
2.   The Model 
2.1  Description of the economy 
Technology and factor payments 
Firms shall be indexed by j.  We assume that the representative firm produces output in 
accordance with the stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function 
1 () ( ) jj j dY A L K K dt du
αα − =+         ( 1 a )    
where Kj denotes the individual firm’s capital stock, Lj denotes the individual firm’s employment of 
labor, K is the average stock of capital in the economy, so that LjK measures the efficiency units of 
labor employed by the firm; see e.g. Corsetti (1997).  The stochastic shock du is temporally 
independent, with mean zero and variance σ
2dt over the instant dt.  The stochastic production 
function exhibits constant returns to scale in the private factors -- labor and the private capital stock. 
All firms face identical production conditions and are subject to the same realization of an 5 
economy-wide stochastic shock.  Hence they will all choose the same level of employment and 
capital stock. That is, K j = K and Lj = L for all j, where L is the average economy-wide level of 
employment.  The average capital stock yields an externality such that in equilibrium the aggregate 
(average) production function is linear in the aggregate capital stock, as in Romer (1986), namely 
() ( ) () d Y A LKd t d u LKd t d u
α =+ ≡ Ω +       (1b)   
where ( ) LA L
α Ω≡  and  /0 . L ∂Ω ∂ >  
  We assume that the wage rate, z, over the period (t,t + dt) is determined at the start of the 
period and is set equal to the expected marginal physical product of labor over that period.  The total 
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, and  K du du ≡ Ω .  
These two equations assume that the wage rate, z, is fixed over the time period (t,t+dt), so 
that the return on capital absorbs all output fluctuations.  The rationale for this assumption is that in 
industrial economies wages are usually fixed ex ante, while the return to capital is, at least in part, 
determined ex post and thus absorbs most of the fluctuations in profitability.
6  Differentiating the 
production function and given that firms are identical, we find that the equilibrium return to capital 
is independent of the stock of capital while the wage rate is proportional to the average stock of 
                                                 
6 In the United States, for example, the relative variability of stock returns over the period 1955-1995 were around 32% 
per annum, while the relative variability of wages over that same period was only 2%. 6 
capital, and therefore grows with the economy.
 7  In addition, we have  /0 rL ∂ ∂> and  /0 wL ∂ ∂<, 
reflecting the fact that more employment raises the productivity of capital but lowers that of labor.
  
Consumers 
There is a mass 1 of infinitely-lived agents in the economy.  Consumers are indexed by i and 
are identical in all respects except for their initial stock of capital, Ki0. Since the economy grows, we 
will be interested in the share of individual i in the total stock of capital, ki, defined as  ii kK K ≡ , 
where  K is the aggregate (or average) stock.  Relative capital has a distribution function  ( ) i Gk , 
mean   1 i ik = ∑ , and variance 
2
k σ .  
All agents are endowed with a unit of time that can be allocated either to leisure, li or to 
work, 1− li ≡ Li.  A typical consumer maximizes expected lifetime utility, assumed to be a function 
of both consumption and the amount of leisure time, in accordance with the isoelastic utility function 
   () 0 0
1
max ( ) ,    with   1, 0, 1  
t




∞ − −∞< < > < ∫    (3) 
where 1− γ  equals the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Empirical evidence suggests that this is 
relatively large, certainly well in excess of unity, so that we shall assume γ < 0.
8  The parameter η 
represents the elasticity of leisure in utility.  This maximization is subject to the agent’s capital 
accumulation constraint 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
               (1 ) ( ) ( ( ))
ik i k i Kw i
Ci i i i
dK rK dt K du w l Kdt
Cd t s E d K s d K E d K
τ ττ
τ
′ =− +− +− −
′ −+ + + −
 
where  duK =Ω du, and capital is assumed not to depreciate.  The fiscal instruments used by the 
government are a subsidy on investment in physical capital, at rates s and ′  s  for the deterministic and 
the stochastic component of investment, respectively; a consumption tax, τc; a wage tax, τw; a tax 
on the deterministic component of capital income, τk, and a tax on the stochastic component of 
capital income,  ′  τ  k.  Taking expectations of this expression and substituting back for E(dKi), we can 
                                                 
7 Intuitively, in a growing economy, with the labor supply fixed, the higher income earned by labor is reflected in higher 
returns, whereas with capital growing at the same rate as output, returns to capital remain constant. 
8 Some of the empirical estimates supporting this assumption are noted in Section 4.2 below.  7 
express this budget constraint as  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
11
ki w i c i k
i iK
rK w l K C
dK dt K du
ss
τ ττ τ ′ −+ −− − + −
=+
′ −−
   (4a) 
It is important to observe that with the equilibrium wage rate being tied to the aggregate 
stock of capital, the rate of accumulation of the individual’s capital stock depends on the aggregate 
stock of capital, which in turn evolves according to 





dK dt K du
ss
ττ τ τ −+ − − − + ′ −
=+
′ −−
     (4b) 
where  l denotes the average (aggregate) fraction of time devoted to leisure.  The agent therefore 
needs to take this relationship into account in performing her optimization. 
Government policy 










′ − ′′ += + + − +
′ −
    (5) 
Note that both expenditures and tax receipts have a deterministic and a stochastic component. 
Equating them respectively yields the following constraints required to maintain a balanced budget:  
  k s τ′′ = ,          ( 6 a )  




τ ττ ψ +− + = ,         ( 6 b )  
where ψ  denotes the average growth rate. 
Two points should be noted.  First, some of the taxes may be negative, in which case they 
become subsidies, in addition to the investment subsidy.  However, neither the deterministic nor the 
stochastic component of the two income taxes can exceed unity.  Second, the assumption that the 
deterministic and stochastic components of income are taxed at different rates requires that the agent 
(and the tax authority) disentangle the deterministic from the stochastic components of income, 8 
something that may not be unlikely in practice.  However, this assumption is mainly made for 
analytical simplicity.  Taxing both components at the same rate, with the government using public 
debt in order to compensate any surplus or deficit, would not change any of our results, since as we 
will see below, the tax rate on the stochastic component of capital income does not affect any of the 
equilibrium relationships.
9   
2.2  Consumer optimization  
The consumer’s formal optimization problem is to maximize (3) subject to equations (4a) 
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ii K Cl wKX
ls
γ η τ η −
=
−
       ( 7 b )  
where X(Ki,K) is the value function and XKi  its derivative with respect to Ki (see Appendix).  
In the Appendix we show that utility maximization implies that the dynamic evolution of the 
stock of capital of agent i is given by 










− − − 
=− Ω + Ω ≡ + Ω  − 
,    (8) 
where Ω and r are defined in equations (1) and (2).  There we have expressed them as functions of 
equilibrium employment, L, but assuming that the aggregate labor market clears, yields 
     1( 1 ) ji ji LL l l = =−= − ∑∑       ( 9 )  
and we can equally well write Ω and r as functions of (1−l).
10  From (8) we see that the rate of 
growth of capital -- and therefore of output -- has a deterministic and a stochastic component, so that 
the average growth rate, ψ , and its standard deviation, σψ  are respectively 
                                                 
9 See Turnovsky (2000b) and García Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2002).  
10 Thus we may write Ω(l) = A(1 − l)












−  −  −  =− Ω
−
 and    ψ σ σ = Ω      ( 1 0 )  
Observe that the only difference between agents, namely their initial stock of capital, does 
not appear in this equation.  Hence all individuals choose the same rate of growth of their stock of 
capital, ψ . This has two implications.  First, the aggregate rate of growth of capital is identical to 
the individual rate of growth and unaffected by the initial distribution of endowments, hence  
dK K dt du ψ =+ Ω .         ( 8 ’ )    
Second, since the capital stock of all agents grows at the same rate, the distribution of capital 
endowments does not change over time. That is, at any point in time, the wealth share of agent i, ki, 
is given by her initial share ki,0, say. 












,         ( 1 1 )  
Aggregating over the individuals and noting that  ki i ∑ =1,  li i ∑ = l, the aggregate economy-wide 
consumption-capital ratio is 













        ( 1 1 ’ )  
In addition, the following transversality condition must hold 
   l i m ( ) 0
t
i t EKt e
γβ −
→∞
 =        ( 1 2 )  
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which, when combined with (10), can be shown to be equivalent to the condition 
                                                 
11 See Turnovsky (2000b). 10 







−  >  − 
        ( 1 3 )  
i.e. the equilibrium rate of return on capital must exceed the equilibrium growth rate.  Dividing the 
aggregate accumulation equation, (4b), by K, this condition can also be shown to be equivalent to 




ττ +> − −       ( 1 3 ’ )  
implying that part of income from capital is consumed.
12.  Combining with (9’), this can be further 
expressed as  







.        ( 1 3 ” )  
Recalling the individual budget constraint, (4a), we can write the individual’s mean rate of 
capital accumulation as 
(/ ) 1 1 1 1
11 1
ii w i c i K
ii
Ed K K l C
rw
dt s s k s K
τ τ τ − −+ −
=+ −
−− −
    (14) 
Together with equation (11), this expression implies that agent i’s supply of labor is 












 −− − −
−= −  +− 
      ( 1 5 )  
Noting the transversality condition,  ψ τ > − − ) 1 /( ) 1 ( s r k , (15) implies that an increase in the agent’s 
capital (wealth) has a negative effect on her labor supply; wealthier individuals chose to “buy” more 
leisure.  In effect, they compensate for their larger capital endowment, and the higher growth rate it 
would support, by providing less labor and having an exactly offsetting effect on the growth rate.  
Because the rate of growth is the same for all agents, individual labor supplies are linear in 
the wealth shares of agents. The aggregate labor supply, 1 1 i i ll −=− ∑ , is then independent of the 
initial distribution of capital. Summing equation (15) over the agents and using the fact that 
1 i ik = ∑ , we obtain the aggregate labor supply relation,  
                                                 
12 This latter condition reduces to CK> 0  in the original Merton (1969) model, which abstracted from labor income. 11 











 −− − −
−= −  +− 
,    (15’) 
and combining (15) and (15’) we can derive the following expression for the “relative labor supply” 
     () 1
1




−= − −  + 
      ( 1 5 ” )  
Again we see that the transversality condition, now expressed as (13”), implies a positive 
relationship between relative wealth and leisure.  This relationship provides the fundamental 
mechanism whereby, given the initial distribution of capital endowments across agents, policy and 
risk are able to influence the distribution of income.   
2.3.  Macroeconomic equilibrium   
The key equilibrium relationships can be summarized by  
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        ( 1 6 a )  
Equilibrium Volatility 
ψ σ σ =Ω          (16b) 
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Individual Budget Constraint 
   
11 1 1
11 1










     ( 1 6 e )  
Goods market equilibrium 
C
K
ψ =Ω−          ( 1 6 f )  
Government budget constraint 




τ ττ ψ +− + =        (16g) 
Recalling the definitions of  ) (l r , ) (l w , and Ω(l), and given ki, these equations jointly 
determine the individual and aggregate consumption-capital ratios,  ii CK , CK, the individual and 
aggregate leisure times, li,  l, average growth rate, ψ , volatility of the growth rate, σψ , and one of 
the fiscal instruments given the other three policy parameters. Note that the tax and subsidy on the 
stochastic components of investment and the return to capital, have no effect on the equilibrium 
variables and thus  ′  τ  k =′   s  can be set arbitrarily. 
Using (16a), (16d), and (16f), the macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy can be 
summarized by the following pair of equations that jointly determine the equilibrium mean growth 
rate, ψ , and leisure l: 
RR    
22 (1 ) ( )(1 ) /(1 )
12
k ls α τβ γ
ψ σ
γ
− Ω− − −
=− Ω
−
,    (17a) 













=Ω −   + −  
.      (17b) 
The first equation describes the relationship between ψ  and l that ensures the equality 
between the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital and return to consumption. The second describes 
the combinations of the mean growth and leisure that ensure product market equilibrium holds.  13 
2.4.   The laissez-faire economy 
It is convenient to examine the equilibrium in the absence of taxation. Setting all taxes and 
subsidies to zero, the equilibrium mean growth rate and leisure are determined by the following pair 
of equations:  
RR:  
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=Ω −  − 
,       
The laissez-faire RR and PP locuses are depicted in Figure 1, and their formal properties are 
derived in the Appendix.
13  First, note that equation PP is always decreasing in l, reflecting the fact 
that more leisure time reduces output, thus increasing the consumption-output ratio and having an 
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This expression is unambiguously negative for γ < 0, as the empirical evidence suggests, and the 
case that we shall assume prevails.  Intuitively, a higher fraction of time devoted to leisure reduces 
the productivity of capital, requiring a fall in the return to consumption. This is obtained if the 
growth of the marginal utility of consumption rises, that is, if the balanced growth rate falls.  Under 








−+ > − .          
We will see in our numerical calibrations that this condition is met for reasonable parameter values.  
3.  The Determinants of the Distribution of Income 
In order to examine the effect of risk on income distribution, we consider the expected 
relative income of an individual with capital ki.  Her (expected) gross income is simply 
                                                 
13 See also Turnovsky (2000b). 14 
() ( 1) ii i E dY rK wK l =+ − , while expected average income is  () ( 1) E dY rK wK l =+ − .  Using 
equation (15) to substitute for labor, we can express the relative (expected) income of individual i, 
()() ii yE d Y E d Y ≡ , as 
(, ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
ii i i i i
w




= +− = + −
+Ω + −
    (18) 
which we may write more compactly as: 
(, ) 1 () ( 1 ) ,    w h e r e     () 1
(1 )(1 )







,    (18’) 
 Equation  (18’)  emphasizes that the distribution of income depends upon two factors, the 
initial (unchanging) distribution of capital, and the equilibrium allocation of time between labor and 
leisure, insofar as this determines factor rewards.  The net effect of an increase in initial wealth on 
the relative income of agent i is given by ρ(l).  As long as the equilibrium is one of positive growth, 
it is straightforward to show that
14 
    0 ( ) 1 l ρ <<         ( 1 9 )  
Thus relative income is strictly increasing in ki, indicating that although richer individuals choose a 
lower supply of labor, this effect is not strong enough to offset the impact of their higher capital 
income.  As a consequence, the variability of income across the agents, σy, is less than their 
(unchanging) variability of capital, σk.   
  The second point to note is that we can rank different outcomes according to inequality 
without needing any information about the underlying distribution of capital. For a given distribution 
of capital, changes in risk or policy affect the distribution of income solely through their impact on 
relative prices, as captured by  ) (l ρ .  Correia (1999) has shown that when agents differ only in their 
endowment of one good, there exists an ordering of outcomes by income inequality, as measured by 
                                                 
14 Writing  ()
1






=− − + − −   +−
.  If the equilibrium is one of positive growth, (17b) implies 
that the first term in brackets is positive, thus ensuring that  ρ(l) > 0.  The fact that ρ(l) <1 is immediate from its 
definition. 15 
second-order stochastic dominance.
15  That ordering is determined by equilibrium prices, and is 
independent of the distribution of endowments.  
  The DD locus in the lower panel of Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between the standard 
deviation of relative income, σy, our measure of income inequality and the standard deviation of 
capital endowments, σk, namely 
  DD   σy = ρ(l)σ k        ( 1 9 c )  
Given the standard deviation of capital, σk, the standard deviation of income is a decreasing and 
concave function of aggregate leisure time. This is because as leisure increases (and labor supply 
declines) the wage rate rises and the return to capital falls, compressing the range of income flows 
between the wealthy with large endowments of capital and the less well endowed.  Thus, having 
determined the equilibrium allocation of labor from the upper panels in Fig. 1, (19c) determines the 
corresponding unique variability of income across agents.   
Because taxes also have direct redistributive effects, we need to distinguish between the 
before-tax and after-tax distribution of income.  We therefore define the agent’s after-tax (or net) 
relative income as 
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(, , , ) 1 (, , ) ( 1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
NET NET ki w i
ii k w w k i
kw
rk w l








   (20a) 
where,  ρ
NET summarizes the distribution of after-tax income and is related to corresponding before-
tax measure, ρ(l), by  
()
()
( , , ) ( ) 1( ) ( 1)











    (20b) 
with the standard deviation of after-tax income given by 
   (, , )
NET NET
yw k k l σ ρτ τ σ =         ( 2 0 c )  
From (20a) and (20b) we see that fiscal policy exerts two effects on the after-tax income distribution. 
                                                 
15 Her results also require that the economy be amenable to Gorman aggregation, which is the case in our setup. 16 
First, by influencing gross factor returns it influences the equilibrium supply of labor, l, and 
therefore the before-tax distribution of income, as summarized by ρ(l).  In addition, it has a direct 
redistributive effect, which is summarized by the second term on the right hand side of (20b).  The 
dispersion of pre-tax income across agents will exceed the after-tax dispersion if and only if τk > τw.  
As we will see below, in most cases tax increases affect the before-tax and after-tax distributions in 
opposite ways. 
Lastly, we compute individual welfare. By definition, this equals the value function used to 
solve the intertemporal optimization problem evaluated along the equilibrium stochastic growth 
path.  For the constant elasticity utility function, the optimized level of utility for an agent starting 
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=
−+ −
      ( 2 1 )  

















       ( 2 2 )  
where the second term has been obtained by substituting for the consumption-capital ratio. Using 
equations (15), we can express relative welfare as 
(1 )
1









=+− −   +  
.        ( 2 2 ’ )  
  Consider now two individuals having relative endowments k2 > k1.  Individual 2 will have 
both a higher mean income but also higher volatility.  The transversality condition (13”) implies that 
if  γ > 0, then their relative welfare satisfies x(k2) > x(k1) > 0, while if γ < 0,  x(k1)> x(k2) > 0.  
However, in the latter case absolute welfare, as expressed by (19) is negative.  Thus in either case, 
the better endowed agent will have the higher absolute level of welfare, so that the distribution of 
welfare moves together with that of income. 17 
4.  The Relationship between Volatility and Inequality 
We now turn to the relationship between volatility, growth, and the distribution of income, 
focusing on how these relationships respond to an increase the volatility of production, σ
2.  In this 
section we examine the case of an economy without taxation. We discuss the relationship 
analytically and then supplement this with some numerical simulations. 
4.1.   Analytical properties 
The effect of risk operates through its impact on the incentives to accumulate capital.  An 
increase in 
2 σ  shifts the RR curve only, and for γ < 0, it shifts the RR curve upwards, as seen in Fig. 
2.  Given the fraction of time devoted to leisure, the shift in RR tends to increase the growth rate. 
The higher ψ  increases the return to consumption, which raises the labor supply, and hence the 
return to capital relative to that of consumption, causing a further increase in the growth rate.  Thus 
the increase in risk raises the mean growth rate and reduces leisure unambiguously, as the 
equilibrium moves from Q to Q’ along PP.  In addition greater risk increases the variance of the 
growth rate, 
2 2 2 σ σψ Ω = , because of both the direct effect of σ
2 and the indirect impact of a lower l 
on Ω.  
  From equations (18’) and (20), we see that the effect of an increase in risk on the gross and 
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An increase in l raises both pre-tax and post-tax inequality.  Greater volatility of the production 
shock, by reducing the amount of time devoted to leisure, increases income inequality, as measured 
by the standard deviation of relative incomes.  Pre-tax inequality will increase more than post-tax 
inequality if and only kw τ τ > , that is, if and only if the initial pre-tax income inequality exceeds the 
initial post-tax inequality. 18 
Risk will also increase measures of inequality other than the standard deviation. To see this it 
suffices to note that the effect of an increase in risk on the relative gross income of an agent with 
capital share ki is given by 
   () 22
()
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An increase in risk raises the income share for those with a wealth share above the average, and 
reduces the income share of those with wealth below. Consequently, inequality rises.  
  The intuition for these results is as follows. Because agents are sufficiently risk-averse, a 
greater variance of output has a strong income effect that makes them increase savings. 
Consequently, the growth rate increases. Note from the PP locus that the allocation of labor is 
unaffected by σ
2 for a given growth rate. A higher growth rate, however, implies higher future 
wages, and hence higher consumption for any extra time spent at work. It therefore reduces leisure 
time and increases the labor supply. The change in the labor supply, in turn, affects the distribution 
of income.  A higher labor supply increases the return to capital and lowers the wage rate.  Since 
labor is distributed more equally  than is capital, the income gap between any two individuals 
increases, and income inequality increases.   
Note that with an inelastic supply of labor, risk would not affect relative incomes. In this 
case, the income of agent i would be given by yi = (w + rki)/(w + r). With the AK technology 
resulting in a constant wage and interest rate, this expression would be unaffected by risk. In our 
setup risk matters because it affects the growth rate, and this, in turn, impacts the labor supply and 
factor rewards. 
4.2.   Numerical examples 
To obtain further insights into the impact of risk on the equilibrium, and in particular the 
relationship between growth and income inequality, we perform some numerical analysis. In order to 
do so we use the following, mostly conventional, parameter values: 
 19 
Parameter Values 
Production   A = 0.75, α =0.60 
Taste  β = 0.04, γ = −2, η = 1.75 
Risk  σ = 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 
The choice of production elasticity of labor measured in efficiency units implies that 60% of output 
accrues to labor.  One consequence of the Romer technology being assumed, is that whereas this 
value is realistic in terms of the labor share of output, it implies an implausibly large externality from 
aggregate capital which implies extreme solutions for the first-best fiscal policy, discussed below.  
The choice of the scale parameter A = 0.75, is set to yield a plausible value for the equilibrium 
capital-output ratio.   
Turning to the taste parameters, the rate of time preference of 4% is standard, while the 
choice of the elasticity on leisure, η =1.75, is standard in the real business cycle literature, implying 
that about 72% of time is devoted to leisure, consistent with empirical evidence.  Estimates of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion are more variable throughout the literature.  Values of the order 
of γ =− 18 (and larger) have sometimes been assumed to deal with the equity premium puzzle (see 
Obstfeld, 1994).  However, these tend to yield implausibly low values of the equilibrium growth 
rate.  By contrast, real business cycle theorists routinely work with logarithmic utility functions 
(γ = 0).  More recently, a consensus seems to be emerging of values between 2 and 5 (see 
Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra 2002) and our choice of γ = −2 is well within that range.   
Our main focus is on considering increases in exogenous production risk, which we let vary 
between  σ = 0.05 and σ = 0.40.  The value σ = 0.05 is close to the mean for OECD countries 
considered by Gali (1994) and Gavin and Hausmann (1995).  Gavin and Hausmann present 
estimates for a wide range of countries and σ = 0.10 corresponds to countries subject to medium 
production risk.  For virtually all countries they find σ < 0.20 so that the values σ = 0.30, σ = 0.40 
are beyond the bounds of plausibility and are reported only to broaden the sensitivity analysis. 
Choosing the distribution of wealth is less straightforward, as data on the distribution of 
wealth are difficult to obtain.  Moreover, income distributions are reported in terms of Gini 20 
coefficients (rather than standard deviations as employed in our theoretical discussion) and Table 1 
reports some actual distributions. The first two lines are the distributions of income in the US and 
Sweden in 1991 and 1992, respectively (from Deininger and Squire, 1996). The third is our 
hypothetical distribution of wealth. The values assumed are consistent with the data.  For example, 
in the US in 1992, the bottom 40% of the population held 0.4% of total wealth, while the top 20% 
owed 83.8% of the total.
16   
The last line reports the income distribution generated by the model, using the hypothetical 
wealth distribution for the case of low risk σ = 0.05.  To obtain it we have assumed that the bottom 
income group has no wealth and no labor endowment (i.e, zero income).  Otherwise, since wages are 
identical for all workers, we would have a very large group with the same income at the bottom of 
the income distribution.  Our assumption implies that the income share of the two bottom groups is 
18.9 and hence of a similar magnitude to that observed in the data (15.2 and 19.1 for the US and 
Sweden, respectively).  The resulting Gini coefficient lies between those of these two countries.  
Table 2 reports the impact of increases in the volatility of the output shock on the equilibrium 
labor supply, the average rate of growth and its standard deviation, the Gini coefficient of income, 
and on overall welfare.  Welfare changes reported are calculated as the percentage equivalent 
variations in the initial stock of capital of the average individual necessary to maintain the level of 
utility following the increase in risk from the benchmark level σ = 0.05 reported in the first row. 
Line 1 of the table suggests that treating σ = 0.05 as a benchmark case leads to a plausible 
equilibrium, having a 3.3% mean growth rate and 1.73% relative standard deviation, with 72.5% of 
time allocated to leisure and a capital-output ratio (not reported) of approximately 3.
17  The implied 
distribution of income is also plausible, as noted. 
As risk increases from σ = 0.05, Table 2 indicates the following.  The mean growth rate 
increases, as does its standard deviation.  The net effect of the greater risk dominates the positive 
effect of the higher growth rate, so that the increase in risk reduces average welfare.  It should be 
noted that for the plausible range of σ < 0.20, the welfare loss is relatively modest.  This is a 
                                                 
16 See Wolff (1998). 
17 The mean growth rate for OECD economies is around 2.2%, with a standard deviation also around 2.2%. 21 
characteristic limitation of this class of model having only aggregate risk, and has been discussed 
elsewhere in the literature.
18  More to the point here, we see that greater risk is associated with a 
substitution toward more labor (less leisure), and an increase in income inequality -- as measured by 
the Gini coefficient -- consistent with the formal analysis presented in Section 3.1.   
In terms of magnitudes, the effect of risk on the Gini coefficient is quite modest, at least for 
plausible degrees of risk.  It is interesting to note that income inequality in the US increased by 2.5 
Gini points between 1980 and 1990, and that this has been considered a sizeable increase.  From 
Table 2 it is seen that for risk alone to generate a similar increase it would have had to increase from 
σ = 0.05 to around σ = 0.4, which is obviously implausible.  Clearly other structural and policy 
changes are primarily responsible.  However, small changes in risk may still play a significant role if 
they give rise to large policy responses.       
5.  Taxation 
A familiar feature of the Romer (1986) model is that by ignoring the externality associated 
capital, the decentralized economy generates a sub-optimally low growth rate.  This suggests that an 
investment subsidy that increases the growth rate, will move the equilibrium closer to the social 
optimum.  With heterogeneous agents, two questions arise.  First, how to finance this subsidy if the 
government is concerned about inequality as well as about average welfare. An investment subsidy 
raises the return to capital and will tend to favor those with large capital holdings.  If the subsidy 
were financed by a lump-sum tax, the system would redistribute away from those with lower 
incomes to those with higher incomes.  Are there ways in which this reverse redistribution can be 
avoided? Second, we want to know whether the use of first-best policies has any implication for the 
relationship between volatility and inequality.  In this section we investigate these questions in some 
detail.  We begin by deriving the first-best optimal rate of growth and allocation of labor. 
                                                 
18 Most notably it is characteristic of Lucas’s (1987) of the cost of business cycles, and it is also discussed at more length 
for a model closer to present by Turnovsky (2000b). 22 
5.1.   The first-best optimum 
Given the externality stemming from the aggregate capital stock, finding the first-best 
optimums amounts to solving the following problem: 
() 0 0
1
max ( ) ,  
t




∞ − ∫        ( 2 3 a )  
subject to  
() ii i i dK K C dt K du =Ω − + Ω          (23b) 
In the Appendix we show that the solution to this problem is given by the equations 
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where the tilde denotes the first-best optimum.  Note that the only difference with the solution to the 
competitive equilibrium in the absence of taxes is that the social rate of return to capital now takes 
into account the production externality and hence exceeds the private return.
19  The R’R’ schedule 
lies above RR.  Given that the PP schedule is steeper than RR, the upward shift of RR results in a 
higher growth rate, lower leisure, and therefore increases inequality, as can be seen from Figure 2.
20   
                                                 
19 The transversality condition (12) for the central planner’s problem again reduces to (13) but is now automatically 
satisfied without further restrictions being imposed. 
20 The reason why the social planner chooses less leisure is that there are in fact two externalities in the model. On the 
one hand, a greater individual stock of capital increases the aggregate level of technology. On the other, a higher labor 
supply raises the marginal product of capital and induces greater accumulation of capital, thus increasing the level of 
technology. 23 
5.2   First-best taxation 
Comparing the first-best optimum, described by R’R’, and PP with the decentralized 
equilibrium, RR, PP we can see that the tax-subsidy system can be used to attain the optimal growth 
rate, leisure time, and consumption/capital ratio by setting 
1
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where the last equation is obtained from the government’s budget constraint, (16g).  The first two 
equations represent intuitive optimality conditions.  The first states that any wage tax should be 
offset with an equivalent consumption tax so as not to distort the leisure-consumption choice.   
Interpreting the tax on wage income as a negative tax on leisure, (24a) states that the two utility 
enhancing goods, consumption and leisure, should be taxed uniformly.  The second condition simply 
ensures that the private rate of return on investment must equal the social return, and for this to be so 
the subsidy to investment must exceed the externality by an amount that reflects any tax on capital 
income.
21  Note from the third equation that unless consumption equals total income, (in which case 
there is zero growth), the replication of the first optimum requires differential taxes on wages and 
capital; τw >
< τ k according to whether there is positive or negative growth. 
  Equations (24) indicate the existence of a degree of freedom in the optimal tax-subsidy 
structure.  One instrument can be set arbitrarily and we shall take it to be s.  In this case (24a) – (24c) 
imply the following first-best optimal tax rates: 
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21The optimal tax rates set out in (24) are similar to those obtained by Turnovsky (2000a) in a pure deterministic 
representative agent endogenous growth model.  24 
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from which we may conclude the following relative magnitudes, in an economy with positive 
growth [1 ( )( /[1 ]); see (17b')] ll αη >−  : 
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There are two things to note about the optimal tax structure.  First, is that for a sufficiently small 
investment subsidy, the optimal tax structure will call for subsidies to both wage income and capital 
income, all financed by the consumption tax.  But as the subsidy increases, both forms of income 
should be taxed, with the revenues financing both the initial investment subsidy and now a subsidy 
to consumption.  This pattern will be seen to be borne out by our simulations.  Second  ˆˆ , kw τ τ  are 
both highly sensitive to the (arbitrary) choice of s.   
What is the impact of the first-best taxation system on distribution?  Recall that the 
dispersion of gross income is given by (17c), where ρ(l) is a decreasing function of leisure time. 
Since the policy increases the time allocated to labor, it will increase gross income inequality.  The 
dispersion of net income in the decentralized economy that mimics the centrally planned equilibrium 
is obtained by substituting the tax rates, (25a), (25b), into (20b) to yield 
()
1
(; , ) 1









     ( 2 6 )  
The striking aspect about (26) is that the distribution of net income is independent of the (arbitrary) 
choice of fiscal instruments employed to achieve this objective.  As long as the equilibrium is one 
with positive growth, the optimal tax requires  ˆ  τ  w < ˆ  τ k.  Then ρ
NET < ρ, and net income is less 
dispersed than is gross income.  In addition, in all of our simulations we find that the direct 
redistributive effect of taxation dominates the indirect effect of changes in factor prices so that the 25 
distribution of net income is less unequal than in the economy without taxes. 
  When the first-best tax system is implemented, the effect of risk on growth and leisure is 
equivalent to that in the laissez-faire economy, as can be easily verified from equations (17). Greater 
risk is therefore associated with a greater supply of labor and hence with more pre-tax inequality. 
The effect of risk on after-tax inequality is, however, ambiguous.  Differentiating (26) with respect 
to l , we can see that there are two opposing effects. On the one hand, more leisure tends to reduce 
pre-tax inequality. On the other, and as long as the subsidy rate is less than 1, a lower labor supply 
implies that a higher wage tax is required in order to finance any given subsidy rate (see (25b)), 
making the fiscal system less progressive. Either effect can dominate, implying that greater risk need 
not result in a more unequal distribution of after-tax income. 
5.3  Alternative policy responses 
  To attain the first-best equilibrium is likely to require the tax rates to assume extreme values, 
even for plausible parameter values; see Table 3 below.  These will generate dramatic changes in the 
distribution of income that may render them politically infeasible.  Indeed, our numerical analysis 
(see Table 3 below) implies differences between the gross and the net Gini coefficients of 14 to 20 
Gini points, whereas actual differences in OECD countries range between 1.5 and 4 points.  Thus, 
we now consider some less drastic policy responses, which nevertheless, as our simulations show, 
may still yield substantial welfare gains. 
Subsidy to Investment Financed by a Tax on Capital Income 
  Suppose that the fiscal authority decides to finance the subsidy to investment with a tax on 
capital income, alone.  Setting τw = τ c = 0 in the government budget constraint (24c) the required 
tax on capital income is: 
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From equations (17a) we see that this policy shifts the RR schedule upwards and leaves the PP 
schedule unchanged, increasing the growth rate and reducing leisure.  The reduction in leisure 26 
increases the pre-tax degree of income inequality, ρ(l).  Recall that the net distribution of income 
was characterized by (18’).  Then, taxing capital income ensures that ρ
NET(l,τwτk)< ρ(l).  If the 
redistributive effect dominates, as our simulations suggest, the after-tax inequality actually declines. 
Subsidy to Investment Financed by a Tax on Wage Income 
Alternatively, the subsidy may be fully financed by a wage tax  
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In this case, both the RR and PP schedules shift up, resulting in a higher growth rate and greater or 
lower leisure, depending on the relative shifts.  The reason for the ambiguous effect on leisure is that 
the wage tax tends to reduce the supply of labor, while the higher growth rate tends to increase it.  
The ambiguous response of labor complicates the impact on the inequality of income.  First, 
the increase/decrease in leisure time will reduce/increase the variance of gross incomes, as seen from 
(18’).  However, the required (positive) wage tax implies taxing the factor that is more equally 
distributed, and for any given distribution of gross incomes this raises the variability of net incomes 
(see (20b) above).  If the policy reduces leisure time, it would then unambiguously increase pre-tax 
and post-tax income inequality.  However, when leisure time increases, the two effects work in 
opposite directions: there will be a reduction in the variability of gross income, while net income 
inequality may increase or decrease as compared to the equilibrium without taxes.
22   
Subsidy to Investment Financed by a Tax on Consumption  
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22 We can, however, see that when the subsidy rate matches the externality, s =α , τw =1 and ρ
NET =1 implying that 
the net income inequality is increased to that of the initial endowment of capital. 27 
in which case ρ
NET(l,τw,τk) = ρ(l).  Again both schedules shift upwards, increasing the growth rate.  
In this case it can be shown that under the weak condition γ < 0, leisure increases, so that gross 
income inequality declines.  Since the consumption tax has no direct redistributive effect, the gross 
and the net distributions of income are identical and hence net income inequality declines as well.  
5.4   Numerical analysis 
Tables 3 - 5 report the numerical effects of a number of different policies, using the 
parameter values described in section 4.2.   
We begin with Table 3, which summarizes the first-best equilibrium in the centrally planned 
economy.  It offers a number of insights that both reinforce and complement our analytical results.  
First, we see that the policy involves a substantial reduction in leisure time (between 10 and 12 
percentage points), raising the growth rate enormously (by a factor of 3!), and only slightly 
increasing volatility.
23  ∆X is the increase in the welfare of the average individual, measured as the 
percentage variation over that in an economy with the same level of risk in the benchmark 
equilibrium (i.e. those in Table 2).  First-best taxation increases the welfare of the average individual 
in the economy by over 20%. 
The effects on income distribution are substantial.  The large reduction in leisure time results 
in a large increase in pre-tax inequality.  However, the redistributive effect is strong enough to offset 
this effect and yield an overall reduction in the Gini coefficient of net income. The reduction in post-
tax inequality relative to the economy without subsidies is large, amounting to between 6 and 12 
Gini points.   
Table 3 also illustrates the analytical results that the first-best equilibrium can be replicated 
by a variety of tax/subsidy configurations, each of which leads to precisely the same post-tax 
distribution of income.  The sensitivity of the tax regime to changes in the subsidy rate is also borne 
out.  Consider for example the case of low risk, σ = 0.05.  In the absence of a subsidy to investment, 
the first best equilibrium can be sustained if income form capital and labor are subsidized at the rates 
of 150% and nearly 600%, respectively, while consumption is taxed at nearly 600%!  This is hardly 
                                                 
23 The implied percentage increase in labor supply is much larger, being of the order of 20%. 28 
a politically viable tax structure.  But the first-best equilibrium can also be attained if, more 
reasonably, investment is subsidized at around 86%, being financed by a tax on capital income of 
around 64%, leaving consumption and labor income untaxed.  Or, if investment and consumption are 
subsidized at 90% and 30% respectively, with taxes on labor income and capital income of 30% and 
75%, respectively. 
Table 3 also considers the effects of increasing risk.  This is shown to reduce leisure, thereby 
increasing the gross income inequality.  At the same time, the decrease in leisure increases the 
growth rate and reduces the redistributive effect, thus reducing the inequality of net income.  In all 
our examples, gross and net income inequality move in opposite ways, with greater volatility 
increasing pre-tax and reducing post-tax inequality. Our numerical results highlight the fact that the 
divergence between pre- and post- tax inequality is greater the more risky the economy is. The 
reason for this is that risk has a strong distortionary effect on the labor supply. Greater risk, by 
raising the labor supply and hence the wage bill, requires a lower wage tax, thus making the tax 
system more progressive. The effect of the increased labor supply is to raise pre-tax inequality, the 
impact of the lower wage tax is to reduce post-tax inequality, and as a result the gap between gross 
and net inequality increases.  
  Table 4 examines a number of alternative non-optimal policies. The first two lines are the 
benchmark case of no intervention, for a low-risk economy (σ = 0.05) and a medium/high risk 
economy (σ = 0.20), respectively. The welfare gains are measured as percentage increases over the 
welfare levels in these two base economies.  We consider in turn the effects of financing a fixed 30% 
investment subsidy through a capital income, wage tax or a consumption tax, respectively.   
Financing by a capital income tax generates the least positive impact on the mean growth rate and on 
welfare.  It raises the pre-tax income inequality, but lowers the post-tax income inequality.   
Employing a wage tax has a significantly larger effect on the mean growth rate and on welfare.  It 
also has the opposite impacts on income distribution, reducing the before tax inequality, but raising 
it after tax.  The consumption tax has the greatest benefit on the average agent and the most 
beneficial effect on the mean growth rate, and it increases the degree of income inequality (both pre- 
and post-tax) slightly.  Interestingly, all three policies have virtually no adverse effect on aggregate 29 
volatility and in fact, the wage tax, by increasing leisure actually permits a substantial increase in the 
growth rate to be accompanied by a small reduction in its volatility. 
The last two row of the table considers financing the subsidy through a combination of wage 
and consumption taxes. In particular, we set τw = −τ c; that is, these two taxes are optimally set, 
although the subsidy is below the first-best level. The effect of this policy on the growth rate is 
stronger than in the previous three cases, the reason being that this policy does not distort the 
allocation of time between labor and leisure.  Employing only a wage or a consumption tax tends to 
reduce the supply of labor, partially offsetting the effect of the subsidy. When both are used, this 
effect is absent.  Since setting τw =− τ c results in faster growth than using only one tax, and since the 
volatility of growth is only slightly higher, this policy generates larger welfare gains than any of the 
pure policies.  The effect on distribution is quite significant.  In contrast to financing the investment 
subsidy by either a wage or a consumption tax alone, financing through a combination of a 
consumption tax and wage subsidy reduces substantially post-tax inequality.  
  The investment subsidy in Table 4 is arbitrary.  Table 5 summarizes a number of second best 
policies, whereby the policy maker sets the optimal subsidy for each of the three modes of finance.  
In the case where it is financed with a tax on capital income, it is able to attain the first-best 
optimum.  Focusing on σ = 0.05, setting s = 85.7% and τk = 64.2% improves welfare by over 20% 
and generates the distribution of income associated with the first-best optimum.  Alternatively, 
setting  s = 57.2%, financed with 26% tax on wages, or s = 60.2% financed with a 25.5% 
consumption tax yield second-best optima.  The interesting aspect about these latter two alternatives 
is that they are fairly moderate policies, in contrast to the first-best, summarized in Table 3.  In 
particular, the consumption tax yields the major portion of the welfare gains obtained in the first-best 
case (19% out of a total increase in welfare of 20.6%), while having only a minimally adverse 
impact on income distribution.  Indeed, to a policymaker concerned with maximizing the welfare of 
the average agent, with minimum distortionary effect on the distribution of income, this policy may 
be particularly attractive. 30 
6.  Conclusions 
Stochastic shocks are a major source of income disparities, and an extensive literature has 
explored how “luck” and the market’s tendency towards convergence combine to create persistent 
inequality Yet this literature is concerned with idiosyncratic shocks that have no relation with 
aggregate shocks. The idea that aggregate uncertainty may also affect the distribution of income 
remains to be explored, and this paper is a first step in that direction.  
We have used an AK stochastic growth model to show that, when agents differ in their initial 
stocks of capital, greater growth volatility is associated with a more unequal distribution  of income. 
Greater risk tends to increase the supply of labor, reducing wages and raising the interest rate. If 
capital endowments are unequally distributed, while labor endowments are not, the change in factor 
prices raises the return to the factor that is the source of inequality, and the distribution of income 
becomes more spread. 
The endogeneity of the labor supply also implies that policies aimed at increasing the growth 
rate will have distributional implications, and we have examined how these differ depending on the 
particular form of the policies. In particular, we have compared financing an investment subsidy 
through a capital income tax, a wage tax, or a consumption tax.  
Our analysis yields two main conclusions. First, it is possible simultaneously to increase the 
growth rate and reduce net income inequality. In many instances, we find that polices that generate 
faster growth are associated with a reduction in the Gini coefficient of post-tax income, allowing the 
policymaker to attain both efficiency and equity goals. Second, it is often the case that fiscal policy 
has opposite effects on the distribution of gross and net income. These results highlight the fact that 
rather than the usual tradeoff between equity and efficiency, policymakers concerned with the 
distribution of income may face a tradeoff between pre- and post-tax inequality. Moreover, the 
divergence between pre and post tax inequality is greater the more risky the economy is. 
Understanding which type of inequalities agents and the social planner care about becomes essential, 
in particular in high risk economies, and it raises the question of whether a slightly more unequal 
distribution of both gross and net incomes may, in certain cases, be a more viable policy than a huge, 
































The Distribution of Income and Wealth 
 
 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Gini 
US: income shares  4.6  10.6 16.6 24.6 43.6  39.1 
Sweden: income shares  6.3  12.8 19.2 24.8 36.9  31.1 
Assumed wealth shares  0 0  1.2  12  86.8  74.2 
Assumed wealth levels  0  0  0.06 0.6 4.34   
Simulated income 
shares  (σ = 0.05) 





Growth and Distribution of Income and Wealth 
 
 
  l  ψ   σψ   ∆X  Gini(y) 
σ = 0.05  72.5 3.30 1.73  --  33.30 
σ = 0.1  72.4 3.40 3.46 -0.68  33.40 
σ = 0.2  72.2 3.79 6.96 -3.41  33.82 
σ = 0.3  71.8 4.45  10.53  -8.04  34.52 
σ = 0.4  71.2 5.43  14.22  -14.70  35.51 
 
 




  s  τw 
(= −τc) 
τk  l  ψ   σψ   Gini(y)  Gini(ny)  ∆X 
 
 

































































































































































































  τk  τw  τc  l  ψ   σψ   Gini(y)  Gini(ny)  ∆X 
σ = 0.05  0 0 0  72.5  3.30  1.73  33.30  33.30  -- 
s=0 
σ = 0.2  0 0 0  72.4  3.79  6.96  33.82  33.82  -- 
σ = 0.05  10.07 0  0  71.6  4.73  1.76  34.80 32.83 7.64 
s=30 
σ = 0.2  10.96 0  0  71.4  5.18  7.09  35.26 33.13 7.65 
σ = 0.05  0 7.63 0 72.8  5.24  1.72  32.79  34.39  9.66 
s=30 
σ = 0.2  0  8.28  0  72.6 5.71 6.89 33.09  34.79 10.18 
σ = 0.05  0  0  5.42 72.3 5.32 1.74 33.75  33.75 10.05 
s=30 
σ = 0.2  0  0  5.98 72.0 5.80 6.98 34.11  34.11 10.54 
σ = 0.05  0 -18.76  18.76  71.2 5.47 1.78 35.55  32.44 10.71 
s=30 







  s  τk  τw  τc  l  ψ   σψ   Gini(y)  Gini(ny)  ∆X 
σ = 0.05  0 0 0 0  72.5  3.30  1.73  33.30  33.30  -- 
σ = 0.2  0 0 0 0  72.4  3.79  6.96  33.82  33.82  -- 
σ = 0.05  85.7 64.17  0  0  67.1 11.53 1.92  41.02  27.06  20.56 
σ = 0.2  85.5 68.82  0  0  66.7 12.20 7.76  41.57  26.42  20.92 
σ = 0.05  57.2  0  25.96  0  74.1 9.07 1.67 30.20  36.56 16.79 
σ = 0.2  57.4  0  27.39  0  74.1 9.54 6.66 30.20  36.97 17.72 
σ = 0.05  60.2  0  0  25.52 72.0 10.40 1.75  34.19  34.19  18.87 
σ = 0.2  60.1  0  0  27.02 71.9 10.87 7.01  34.39  34.39  19.72 
 A.1 
Appendix 
This appendix provides some of the technical details underlying the derivations of the 
equilibrium conditions (8) and (16a) to (16g). 
A.1 Consumer  optimization 
Agent i‘s stochastic maximization problem is to choose her individual consumption-capital 
ratio and the fraction of time devoted to leisure to maximize expected lifetime utility  
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subject to her individual capital accumulation constraint 
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and the aggregate capital accumulation constraint 
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.            ( A . 1 c )  
Since the agent perceives two state variables, Ki, K, we consider a value function of the form  
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t
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the differential generator of which is 
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  The individual’s problem is to choose consumption, leisure, and the rate of capital 
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In doing this, she takes the evolution of the aggregate variables and the externality as given.  Taking 
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  In addition, the value function must satisfy the Bellman equation 
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1
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    ( A . 5 )  
The Bellman equation is a function of two state variables, individual and aggregate capital, and 
hence it is a partial differential equation in these two variables. Using equations (A.1b) and (A.1b’), 
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    (A.6) 
Next we take the partial derivative of the Bellman equation with respect to Ki, noting that li 
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Consider nowXKi = XK i(Ki,K).  Taking the stochastic differential of this quantity yields: A.3 
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Taking expected values of this expression, dividing by dt, and substituting the resulting equation 
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The solution to this equation is by trial and error.  Given the form of the objective function, 
we propose a value function of the form: 
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       ( A . 1 2 )  
Now, returning to the first-order condition (A.4a), computing the stochastic differential of 
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Along the balanced growth path, Ci Ki is constant.  HencedCi /Ci = dKi /Ki =ψdt + dw, and thus 
     () 2 1









γ ψγγ σ =− + − −       ( A . 1 4 )  
As will be shown below (see equation (A.26)), the government’s balanced budget implies that the 
stochastic component of the individual budget constraint is  A.4 
dk du =Ω .          ( A . 1 5 )  
Combining (A.13), (A.14), and (A.15) yields the mean growth rate of individual consumption  
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and summing over all agents we have the aggregate consumption to wealth ratio, 













.        ( A . 1 9 )  
From the individual budget constraint, the rate of growth is 
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,      ( A . 2 0 )  
which using (A.18) and rearranging gives 














    (A.21) 
A.2 Macroeconomic  equilibrium 
Note that the growth rate is the same for all agents, irrespective of their initial wealth 
holdings. Equation (A.16) is hence the mean growth rate of the economy. The dynamic evolution of 
the aggregate stock of capital is given by A.5 
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and the standard deviation (volatility) of the growth rate is  
ψ σ σ =Ω .         ( A . 2 2 )  
Summing (A.21) over all agents gives a relationship between the aggregate labor supply and the 












      ( A . 2 3 )  
Goods market equilibrium requires  () dK K dt du Cdt = Ω+ − , which taking expectations and dividing 
by K yields, 
C
K
ψ =Ω− .          ( A . 2 4 )  
Equations (A.16), (A.22) (A,18), (A.19), (A.20), (A.24), and (16g) are the macroeconomic 
equilibrium conditions as specified in equations (16a) – (16g), respectively 
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= ,         (A.25d) 
ψ σ σ =Ω ,          ( A . 2 5 e )  
which jointly determine the consumption-capital ratio, the average growth rate, the labor supply, and 
the volatility of growth.   A.6 
A.3  Existence of a balanced growth equilibrium 
It suffices to focus on the economy without taxation; the introduction of taxes leads to minor 
modifcations and can be analyzed analogously.  Differentiating the relations in (A.25) we obtain 
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so that both schedules have a negative slope. Using the fact that Ω=A 1− l ()
α , and under the 
assumption that α <1/2, both the (PP) and (RR) schedules can be shown to be strictly concave (see 
Turnovsky, 2000b, for more details).  Also 
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A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium is 
ψ PP(l = 0) >ψ RR(l = 0). In this case, the (PP) schedule is below (RR) for l =1, and the two schedules 









−+ > − ,        ( A . 2 7 )  
i.e. when risk is not excessively high. When equation (A.27) is not satisfied either an equilibrium 
does not exists or there are two. 











.       ( A . 2 8 )  
Since atl = 0,  l /(1 − l) has its lowest and Ω(l) its highest possible value, PP is everywhere steeper 
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A.4  The centrally planned economy 
The social planner’s problem (23), leads to the following Bellman equation  
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and hence 
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which together with (A.14) and (A.15) above yield (16a’).  
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Goods market equilibrium is again given by equation (A.24).  Using (A.19’), the equilibrium 
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. 
(A.30) is thus decreasing in l and a sufficient condition for concavity is α <1/2. The necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium, ψ PP(l = 0) >ψ RR''(l = 0), is now 
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